

# Estimating size requirements for pairings: Simulating the Tower-NFS algorithm in $GF(p^n)$

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## Cryptographic pairing: black-box properties

$(\mathbf{G}_1, +)$ ,  $(\mathbf{G}_2, +)$ ,  $(\mathbf{G}_T, \cdot)$  three cyclic groups of large prime order  $\ell$

Bilinear Pairing: map  $e : \mathbf{G}_1 \times \mathbf{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbf{G}_T$

1. bilinear:  $e(P_1 + P_2, Q) = e(P_1, Q) \cdot e(P_2, Q)$ ,  
 $e(P, Q_1 + Q_2) = e(P, Q_1) \cdot e(P, Q_2)$
2. non-degenerate:  $e(g_1, g_2) \neq 1$  for  $\langle g_1 \rangle = \mathbf{G}_1$ ,  $\langle g_2 \rangle = \mathbf{G}_2$
3. efficiently computable.

Mostly used in practice:

$$e([a]P, [b]Q) = e([b]P, [a]Q) = e(P, Q)^{ab} .$$

$\leadsto$  Many applications in asymmetric cryptography.

## Examples of application

- ▶ 1984: idea of identity-based encryption formalized by Shamir
- ▶ 1999: first practical identity-based cryptosystem of Sakai-Ohgishi-Kasahara
- ▶ 2000: constructive pairings, Joux's tri-partite key-exchange (Triffie-Hellman)
- ▶ 2001: IBE of Boneh-Franklin, short signatures Boneh-Lynn-Shacham

Rely on

- ▶ Discrete Log Problem (DLP): given  $g, y \in \mathbf{G}$ , compute  $x$  s.t.  $g^x = y$  Diffie-Hellman Problem (DHP)
- ▶ bilinear DLP and DHP  
Given  $\mathbf{G}_1, \mathbf{G}_2, \mathbf{G}_T, g_1, g_2, g_T$  and  $y \in \mathbf{G}_T$ , compute  $P \in \mathbf{G}_1$  s.t.  $e(P, g_2) = y$ , or  $Q \in \mathbf{G}_2$  s.t.  $e(g_1, Q) = y$   
if  $g_T^x = y$  then  $e(g_1^x, g_2) = e(g_1, g_2^x) = g_T^x = y$
- ▶ pairing inversion problem

## Pairing setting: elliptic curves

$$E/\mathbb{F}_p : y^2 = x^3 + ax + b, \quad a, b \in \mathbb{F}_p, \quad p \geq 5$$

- ▶ proposed in 1985 by Koblitz, Miller
- ▶  $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$  has an efficient group law (chord and tangent rule)  $\rightarrow \mathbf{G}$
- ▶  $\#E(\mathbb{F}_p) = p + 1 - tr$ , trace  $tr$ :  $|tr| \leq 2\sqrt{p}$
- ▶ efficient group order computation (*point counting*)
- ▶ large subgroup of prime order  $\ell$  s.t.  $\ell \mid p + 1 - tr$  and  $\ell$  coprime to  $p$
- ▶  $E[\ell] \simeq \mathbb{Z}/\ell\mathbb{Z} \oplus \mathbb{Z}/\ell\mathbb{Z}$  (for crypto)
- ▶ only generic attacks against DLP on well-chosen genus 1 and genus 2 curves
- ▶ optimal parameter sizes ( $\log_2 \ell = \log_2 p$ )

# Pairings

1948 Weil pairing (accouplement)

1958 Tate pairing

1985 Miller, Koblitz: use Elliptic Curves in crypto

1986 Miller's algorithm to compute pairings

1988 Kaliski's implementation  $E/\mathbb{F}_{11} : y^2 = x^3 - x$  (PhD at MIT)

At that time:

- ▶ easy to use supersingular curves for ECC: group order known

# Supersingular elliptic curves

Example over  $\mathbb{F}_p$ ,  $p \geq 5$

$$E : y^2 = x^3 + x / \mathbb{F}_p, \quad p = 3 \pmod{4}$$

s.t.  $t = 0$ ,  $\#E(\mathbb{F}_p) = p + 1$ .

take  $p$  s.t.  $p + 1 = 4 \cdot \ell$  where  $\ell$  is prime.

1993: Menezes-Okamoto-Vanstone and Frey-Rück attacks

$\exists$  pairing  $e : E(\mathbb{F}_p)$  into  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  where **DLP is much easier**.

**Do not use supersingular curves (1993–1999)**

But computing a pairing is **very slow**:

[Harasawa Shikata Suzuki Imai 99]: 161467s (112 days) on a 163-bit supersingular curve, where  $\mathbf{G}_T \subset \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  of 326 bits.

## Pairing-based cryptography

1999: Frey–Muller–Rück: actually, Miller Algorithm can be **much faster**.

2000: [Joux ANTS] Computing a pairing can be done efficiently (1s on a supersingular 528-bit curve,  $\mathbf{G}_T \subset \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  of 1055 bits).

### Weil or Tate pairing on an elliptic curve

Discrete logarithm problem with one more dimension.

$$e : E(\mathbb{F}_{p^n})[\ell] \times E(\mathbb{F}_{p^n})[\ell] \longrightarrow \mathbb{F}_{p^n}^*, \quad e([a]P, [b]Q) = e(P, Q)^{ab}$$

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- ▶ discrete logarithm computation in  $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$  : hard problem (exponential, in  $O(\sqrt{\ell})$ )


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- ▶ discrete logarithm computation in  $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$  : hard problem (exponential, in  $O(\sqrt{\ell})$ )
- ▶ discrete logarithm computation in  $\mathbb{F}_{p^n}^*$  : **easier**, **subexponential** → take a large enough field

## Pairing-friendly curves

$\ell \mid p^n - 1$ ,  $E[\ell] \subset E(\mathbb{F}_{p^n})$ ,  $n$  **embedding degree**

Tate Pairing:  $e : E(\mathbb{F}_{p^n})[\ell] \times E(\mathbb{F}_{p^n})/\ell E(\mathbb{F}_{p^n}) \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{p^n}^*/(\mathbb{F}_{p^n}^*)^\ell$

When  $n$  is small i.e.  $1 \leq n \leq 24$ , the curve is *pairing-friendly*.

This is very rare: For a given curve,  $\log n \sim \log \ell$

([Balasubramanian Koblitz]).

$p^n$	$p^2, p^6$	$p^3, p^4, p^6$	$p^{12}$	$p^{16}$	$p^{18}$
Curve	supersingular	MNT	BN, BLS12	KSS16	KSS18

MNT,  $n = 6$ :

$$p(x) = 4x^2 + 1, t(x) = 1 \pm 2x, \#E(\mathbb{F}_p)x^2 \mp 2x + 1$$

BN,  $n = 12$ :

$$p(x) = 36x^4 + 36x^3 + 24x^2 + 6x + 1, t(x) = 6x^2 + 1,$$

$$r(x) = 36x^4 + 36x^3 + 18x^2 + 6x + 1$$

More in Aranha's talk.

## security estimates

[Lenstra-Verheul'01] estimates RSA key-sizes

The usual security estimates use

- ▶ the asymptotic complexity of the best known algorithm (here NFS)
- ▶ the latest record computations (now 768-bit)
- ▶ extrapolation


# Number Field Sieve Algorithm

Subexponential asymptotic complexity:

$$L_{p^n}[\alpha, c] = e^{(c+o(1))(\log p^n)^\alpha (\log \log p^n)^{1-\alpha}}$$

- ▶  $\alpha = 1$ : exponential
  - ▶  $\alpha = 0$ : polynomial
  - ▶  $0 < \alpha < 1$ : sub-exponential (including NFS)
1. polynomial selection (less than 10% of total time)
  2. relation collection  $L_{p^n}[1/3, c]$
  3. linear algebra  $L_{p^n}[1/3, c]$
  4. individual discrete log computation  $L_{p^n}[1/3, c' < c]$

## Example for RSA key sizes



## Pairing key-sizes in the 2000's

Assumed: DLP in prime fields  $\mathbb{F}_p$  as hard as in medium and large characteristic fields  $\mathbb{F}_Q$

→ take the same size as for prime fields.

Security level	$\log_2 \ell$	finite field	$n$	$\log_2 p$	$\deg P$ $p = P(u)$	$\rho$	curve
128	256	3072		3072	(prime field)		
128	256	3072	2	1536	no poly	6	supersingular
	256	3072	3	1024	no poly	4	supersingular
	256	3072	12	256	4	1	Barreto-Naehrig
192	640	7680	12	640	4	$1 \rightarrow 5/3$	BN
	427	7680	12	640	6	$3/2$	BLS12
	384	9216	18	512	8	$4/3$	KSS18
	384	7680	16	480	10	$5/4$	KSS16
	384	11520	24	480	10	$5/4$	BLS24



## Small, medium, large characteristic

$Q = p^n$ , the characteristic  $p$  is

- ▶ small:  $p = L_Q[\alpha, c]$  where  $\alpha < 1/3$
- ▶ medium:  $p = L_Q[\alpha, c]$  where  $1/3 < \alpha < 2/3$
- ▶ large:  $p = L_Q[\alpha, c]$  where  $\alpha > 2/3$
- ▶ boundary cases:  $p = L_Q[1/3, c]$  and  $p = L_Q[2/3, c]$

## Estimating key sizes for DL in $\text{GF}(p^n)$

$\text{GF}(p^n)$  much less studied than  $\text{GF}(p)$  or integer factorization.

- ▶ 2000 LUC, XTR cryptosystems: multiplicative subgroup of prime order  $\mid \Phi_n(p)$  (cyclotomic subgroup) of  $\text{GF}(p^2)$ ,  $\text{GF}(p^6)$
- ▶ what is the hardness of computing DL in  $\text{GF}(p^n)$ ,  $n = 2, 6$ ?
- ▶ 2005 [Granger Vercauteren]  $L_Q[1/2]$
- ▶ 2006 Joux–Lercier–Smart–Vercauteren  $L_Q[1/3, 2.423]$  (NFS-HD)
- ▶ rising of pairings: what is the security of DL in  $\text{GF}(2^n), \text{GF}(3^m), \text{GF}(p^{12})$ ?

# Asymptotic complexities

Needed:

- ▶ asymptotic complexity (constants  $\alpha, c$ )
- ▶ record computations to scale the shape (guess the  $o(1)$ )

Asymptotic complexities now:

- ▶ For tiny characteristic: quasi-polynomial
- ▶ For small characteristic:  $L(\alpha)$  for  $\alpha < 1/3$
- ▶ For medium and large characteristic:  $L(1/3, c + o(1))$

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What is  $c$  for medium and large characteristic?

# Theoretical improvements and records

	theoretical improvements	record computations
2013	Joux–Pierrot (SNFS for pairings)	
2014	MNFS, Conjugation	$GF(p^2)$
2015	TNFS	$GF(p^2)$ , $GF(p^3)$ , $GF(p^4)$
2016	Sarkar–Singh, exTNFS	$GF(p^3)$
2017	more exTNFS	NFS-HD: $GF(p^5)$ , $GF(p^6)$

## Estimating key sizes for DL in $\text{GF}(p^n)$

- ▶ Latest variants of TNFS (Kim–Barbulescu, Kim–Jeong) seems most promising for  $\text{GF}(p^n)$  where  $n$  is composite
- ▶ We need record computations if we want to extrapolate from asymptotic complexities
- ▶ The asymptotic complexities do not correspond to a fixed  $n$ , but to a ratio between  $n$  and  $p$  in  $Q = p^n$

# Complexities

large characteristic  $p = L_Q[\alpha]$ ,  $\alpha > 2/3$ :

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$(64/9)^{1/3} \simeq 1.923$  NFS

special  $p$ :

$(32/9)^{1/3} \simeq 1.526$  SNFS (e.g. Thomé's talk)

medium characteristic  $p = L_Q[\alpha]$ ,  $1/3 < \alpha < 2/3$ :

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$(96/9)^{1/3} \simeq 1.201$  prime  $n$  NFS-HD (Conjugation)

$(48/9)^{1/3} \simeq 1.747$  composite  $n$ ,  
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
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## The NFS diagram for DLP in $\mathbb{F}_{p^n}^*$

Let  $f, g$  be two polynomials defining two number fields and such that in  $\mathbb{F}_p[z]$ ,  $f$  and  $g$  have a common irreducible factor  $\varphi(z) \in \mathbb{F}_p[z]$  of degree  $n$ , s.t. one can define the extension  $\mathbb{F}_{p^n} = \mathbb{F}_p[z]/(\varphi(z))$

Diagram:






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Diagram: Large  $p$ :




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
Diagram: Large  $p$ :



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Diagram: Medium  $p$ : [Joux Lercier Smart Vercauteren 06]



# NFS parameters

- ▶ factor base =  
 $\{\text{prime ideals } \mathfrak{p}_i, \mid \text{Norm}(\mathfrak{p}_i) \leq B\}$   
 $\cup \{\text{prime ideals } \mathfrak{r}_j, \mid \text{Norm}(\mathfrak{r}_j) \leq B\}$
- ▶ we need as many relations as prime ideals  $\mathfrak{p}_i, \mathfrak{r}_j$  to get a square matrix
- ▶ balance the relation collection time with the linear algebra time

# Algebraic Norms

The asymptotic complexity is determined by the *size of norms* of the elements  $\sum_{0 \leq i < t} a_i \alpha^i$  in the relation collection step.

We want both sides *smooth* to get a relation.

“An ideal is *B-smooth*” approximated by  
“its norm is *B-smooth*”.

Smoothness bound:  $B = L_{p^n}[1/3, \beta]$

Size of norms:  $L_{p^n}[2/3, c_N]$


Complexity: minimize  $c_N$  in the formulas.

To reduce NFS complexity, reduce size of norms *asymptotically*.

→ very hard task.

## Extended TNFS [Kim Barbulescu 16]

- ▶ Tower NFS (TNFS): Barbulescu Gaudry Kleinjung
- ▶ Extended TNFS: Kim–Barbulescu, Kim–Jeong, Sarkar–Singh
- ▶ Tower of number fields
- ▶  $\deg(h)$  will play the role of  $t$ , where  $a_0 + a_1\alpha + \dots + a_{t-1}\alpha^{t-1}$
- ▶  $a_0 - a_1\alpha$  becomes  $(a_{00} + a_{01}\tau) - (a_{10} + a_{11}\tau)\alpha$



# Complexities

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# Largest record computations in $\text{GF}(p^n)$ with NFS<sup>1</sup>

Finite field	Size of $p^n$	Cost: CPU days	Authors	sieving dim
$\text{GF}(p^{12})$	203	11	[HAKT13]	7
$\text{GF}(p^6)$	422	9,520	[GGMT17]	3
$\text{GF}(p^5)$	324	386	[GGM17]	3
$\text{GF}(p^4)$	392	510	[BGGM15b]	2
$\text{GF}(p^3)$	593	8,400	[GGM16]	2
$\text{GF}(p^2)$	595	175	[BGGM15a]	2
$\text{GF}(p)$	768	1,935,825	[KDLPS17]	2

None used TNFS, only NFS and NFS-HD were implemented.

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<sup>1</sup>Data extracted from DiscreteLogDB



## Limitations of asymptotic complexity

use:  $\text{Norm}_{K_f}(a(\alpha)) = \text{Res}(a(x), f(x))$  (for monic  $f$ )

$$|\text{Res}(a, f)| \leq (d_a + 1)^{d_f/2} (d_f + 1)^{d_a/2} \|a\|_\infty^{d_f} \|f\|_\infty^{d_a}$$

- ▶ based on bounds on coefficient size of polynomials, bounds on algebraic norms
- ▶ Kalkbrener, Bistritz–Lifshitz bounds are not satisfying enough
- ▶ no record computation available to re-scale the asymptotic formulas

Finding a better estimation and designing an implementation at the same time

# Menezes–Sarkar–Singh Estimations

curve	$\log_2 p^n$	$\log_2 p$	variant	deg $h$	cost
BN	3072	256	TNFS with constants	4	$2^{136}$
BN	3732	311	TNFS without constants	4	$2^{128}$
BN	3072	256	STNFS with constants	6	$2^{150}$
BN	4596	383	STNFS without constants	6	$2^{128}$
BLS	4608	384	TNFS with constants	4	$2^{156}$
BLS	4608	384	TNFS without constants	4	$2^{140}$
BLS	4608	384	STNFS with constants	6	$2^{189}$
BLS	4608	384	STNFS without constants	6	$2^{132}$

# Simulation

- ▶ compute record-looking polynomials
- ▶ simulate relation collection → extrapolate the number of relations
- ▶ estimate linear algebra
- ▶ neglect individual log

## Questions:

- ▶ how to simulate well without being too slow?
- ▶ how to model the filtering step (packing the matrix)?
- ▶ by how much balancing relation collection and linear algebra?

# Barbulescu-Duquesne simulation

Estimation of cost:

$$\frac{2B}{\mathcal{A} \log B} \rho \left( \frac{\log_2 N_f}{\log_2 B} \right)^{-1} \rho \left( \frac{\log_2 N_g}{\log_2 B} \right)^{-1} + 2^7 \frac{B^2}{\mathcal{A} (\log B)^2 (\log_2 B)^2}$$

where  $\mathcal{A} \leq n / \gcd(\deg h, n / \deg h)$ ,

$\rho$  is the Dickman- $\rho$  function

- ▶ takes into account Galois automorphisms
- ▶ takes into account filtering (reduced matrix)
- ▶ assume the coefficients of  $h, f$  are minimal
- ▶ assume  $\alpha(f), \alpha(g) = 0$
- ▶ balance cost of sieving  $\approx$  cost of linear algebra

## Barbulescu-Duquesne estimates

curve	$\log_2 p^n$	$\log_2 p$	deg $h$	cost
BN	3072	256	6	$2^{99,69}$
BN	5534	462	6	$2^{128}$
BLS	5530	461	6	$2^{128}$

## Simulation without sieving

space:  $\mathcal{S} = \{ \sum_{0 \leq i < d_h} a_i y^i + (\sum_{0 \leq i < d_h} b_i y^i)x, |a_i|, |b_i| < A \}$

volume:  $Vol = 2^{2d_h-1} A^{2d_h}$

algebraic norm:

$N = \text{Norm}_{K_f}(a(\alpha_h, \alpha_f)) = \text{Res}_y(\text{Res}_x(a(x, y), f(x)), h(y))$   
(monic  $h, f$ )

$N$  is  $B$ -smooth ( $N = \prod_{p_i < B} p_i^{e_i}$ ) with probability

$$u = \frac{\log N + \alpha}{\log B}, \quad \text{Pr} = \rho(u) + (1 - \gamma) \frac{\rho(u - 1)}{\log N}$$

where  $\gamma \approx 0.577$  is Euler  $\gamma$  constant,

$\rho$  is Dickman- $\rho$  function

# Simulation without sieving


Implementation of Barbulescu–Duquesne technique

Variants:

- ▶ compute  $\alpha(f), \alpha(g)$  (w.r.t. subfield)
- ▶ select  $h, f, g$  with good low  $\alpha(f) < -3, \alpha(g) < -4$
- ▶ Monte-Carlo simulation with  $10^6$  to  $10^9$  points in  $\mathcal{S}$  taken at random. For each point:
  1. compute its algebraic norm  $N_f, N_g$  in each number field
  2. smoothness probability with Dickman- $\rho$
- ▶ Average smoothness probability over the subset of points  
→ estimation of the total number of possible relations in  $\mathcal{S}$
- ▶ dichotomy to approach the best balanced parameters:  
smoothness bound  $B$ , coefficient bound  $A$ .

# MNT curves, $\mathbf{G}_T \subset \mathbb{F}_{p^6}$

$\log_2 \text{Vol}(S)$





## Observations

$(a) = (\sum_{i=0}^{d_h-1} a_i \tau)$ ,  $(b) = (\sum_{i=0}^{d_h-1} b_i \tau)$  randomly chosen are coprime with probability  $1/\zeta_{K_h}(2)$

Much different than for integers:  $1/\zeta(2) = 6/\pi^2 \approx 0.6$

$$\zeta_{K_h}(s) = \sum_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \frac{1}{n^s} (\#\text{ideals of norm } n \text{ in } K_h)$$

$h = x^2 + 1$ :  $1/\zeta_{K_h}(2) \approx 0.6$

$h = x^2 - x + 4$ :  $1/\zeta_{K_h}(2) \approx 0.469$

$h = x^2 + x - 1$ :  $1/\zeta_{K_h}(2) \approx 0.861$

Experimentally: a good  $\alpha$  comes with a low coprime probability

## Future work

- ▶ How to rank polynomials according to their smoothness properties?  $\alpha$  function (S. Singh) **faster**, generalized Murphy's  $E$  function
- ▶ How to build the factor basis?
- ▶ How to deal with generalized bad ideals?
- ▶ **How to sieve very efficiently in even dimension 4 to 24?**

Thank you for your attention.